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MED-ARB ADOPTION IN SECURITIES LAW DISPUTES: 
ADVANTAGES AND COSTS 
 
Hyung Kyun Kwon* 
 
 This Article considers the adoption of a hybrid method of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR)—Med-Arb—in securities law disputes. Because 
securities law ADR is currently monopolized by claims that proceed through 
arbitration, this Article argues that the benefits of settling a claim through 
mediation are being lost. Med-Arb allows parties to access the benefits of 
both mediation and arbitration with potentially lower economic costs and the 
assurance of finality of the dispute. This Article therefore presents how best 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 1925, congestion in the court system and increasing litigation costs 
led the United States Congress to pass the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1 
Since then, the legal industry has frequently used arbitration, a form of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), to resolve legal disputes in the United 
States.2 
 With its simple and cost-efficient features, arbitration soon became 
the norm for ADR in many legal disputes, such as labor and employment 
conflicts.3 Securities traders innately crave cost savings and are naturally 
drawn to arbitration because of its efficiency. In an effort to steer dispute 
resolution toward arbitration, securities traders increasingly used mandatory 
arbitration clauses in investment contracts, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States approved the use of these clauses in 1987. 4  Since then, 
mandatory arbitration has been the primary ADR device used to resolve 
securities law disputes.5 
However, arbitration is not the only ADR method available for 
securities disputes. In addition to arbitration, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) also allows the use of mediation in securities disputes.6 
Despite the presence of this alternative option—mediation—the vast majority 
of cases are resolved through arbitration.7 In 2015, roughly 99% of securities 
                                                 
1 See Zachary E. Davison, Minding the Gap: A Call for Standardizing Pre-dispute 
Arbitration Clauses in OTC Derivative Transactions, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 707, 714 
(2015). 
2 Id. at 716. 
3  See Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the 
Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 20 n.94 (2014). 
4 In Wilko v. Swan, the Supreme Court initially outlawed use of mandatory arbitration 
provisions in securities contracts as a result of the non-waiver provisions of the Securities 
Act of 1933, viewing arbitration as inadequate to protect investors’ rights. 346 U.S. 427, 438 
(1953). However, in Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court upheld the use of 
mandatory provisions, holding that Wilko did not apply to claims under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s oversight 
authority protects the parties’ substantive rights. 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987); Davison, supra 
note 1, at 715–16. 
5 Davison, supra note 1, at 715–16. 
6 See Overview, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-
mediation /overview (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (referring to the Overview of Arbitration & 
Mediation portion of the site). 
7  See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www 
.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics#mediationstats (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2017). 
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cases were filed with arbitration clauses, and only 9% of the cases were 
resolved in mediation.8 Despite arbitration’s efficiency and credibility, the 
overwhelming preference for arbitration is undesirable because in some cases 
mediation can be more effective than arbitration. 
This Article suggests the adoption of an alternative, hybrid method of 
the two existing systems, called Med-Arb, as a prospective solution that can 
help improve the efficiency of ADR in the securities context. As the title 
directly reflects, Med-Arb combines features of mediation and arbitration9 
and is composed of two separate phases that mimic mediation and arbitration 
respectively. In Med-Arb, mediation and arbitration happen in the same place 
and time—this reduces costs and promotes an efficient resolution of the 
dispute. 10  Med-Arb reduces overall ADR costs because it appropriately 
encourages the increased use of mediation (instead of arbitration) in the 
resolution of disputes. 
To analyze and evaluate Med-Arb’s applicability to resolving 
securities law disputes, this Article will present a three-part analysis. First, 
this Article examines the current ADR structure of securities law disputes and 
assesses the problems of the current system. It then introduces and analyzes 
the elements and characteristics of the Med-Arb approach and evaluates its 
strengths and weaknesses. Next, this Article presents a framework for how 
Med-Arb can be used effectively to resolve securities law disputes, arguing 
that the benefits of the supervised use of the Med-Arb approach ultimately 
outweigh its costs. 
I. OVERVIEW OF ADR IN SECURITIES LAW DISPUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since the Supreme Court approved the use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses in investor contracts for securities in the Shearson/American Express 
v. McMahon11 decision in 1987, ADR has become the most common practice 
for resolving securities disputes.12 Most modern investment contracts include 
arbitration provisions, mediation provisions, or both.13 Accordingly, most 
                                                 
8 See id. 
9  John T. Blankenship, Developing Your ADR Attitude Med-Arb: A Template for 
Adaptive ADR, 42 TENN. B.J. 28, 28 (2006). 
10 Id. 
11 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). 
12 Davison, supra note 1, at 716; see also Byron Crowe II, Financial Services ADR: 
What the United States Could Learn from South Africa, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 145, 152 
(2014). 
13 See Crowe II, supra note 12, at 146. 
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securities disputes are settled using these ADR methods, 14  with most 
proceeding through arbitration.15 This section will introduce a brief historical 
background of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) dispute 
resolution; explain the structural features of FINRA arbitration and 
mediation; and examine the inherent problems of the existing system. 
A. Historical and Institutional Background of Governance 
The seemingly straightforward structure of ADR in securities law 
disputes began in 1933 when Congress increased efforts to regulate financial 
markets.16 After the disastrous experience of the Great Depression, Congress 
realized that the securities market needed an authoritative and resourceful 
monitoring institution to govern securities matters and prevent another 
financial disaster.17 As a result, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in an effort to restore confidence in 
U.S. capital markets.18 Notably, with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Congress delegated power to regulate securities to a new agency—the SEC.19 
Entrusted with this newly granted authority, the SEC became the sole 
regulatory body responsible for governing and monitoring participants in the 
securities markets.20 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires all traders 
to register with the SEC.21 Once registered with the SEC, traders are bound 
to comply with SEC rules and regulations.22 
After several years, however, Congress realized that the SEC might 
need help regulating securities markets. 23  Thus, Congress passed an 
additional law—the Maloney Act—that formed a group of non-governmental 
institutions, called self-regulatory organizations (SROs), to assist with SEC 
operations.24 The SROs alleviate some of the SEC’s administrative burden 
                                                 
14 See id. at 160; see also Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7. 
15 See id. 
16  See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about 
/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 Crowe II, supra note 12, at 150. 
21 Id. at 150–51. 
22 See id. at 151. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
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by helping regulate broker-dealers and their representatives. 25  While 
technically the SEC delegates this authority to the SROs,26 the SEC still 
retains control over broker-dealers because the Maloney Act mandates that 
SROs register with, and be authorized by, the SEC.27 Thus, broker-dealers 
remain under incidental control of the SEC, as the SEC directly controls the 
SROs, which hold regulatory authority over the broker-dealers and their 
representatives.28 Originally, there were several SROs governing different 
types of broker-dealers,29 but in 2003 all of the functions were unified under 
a single flagship, FINRA.30 Currently, FINRA is the only SRO that supports 
SEC governance for broker-dealers and their representatives.31  
B. FINRA Dispute Resolutions 
In addition to handling administrative duties that assist the SEC’s 
securities governance, FINRA also performs another critical function: 
providing an official tribunal for securities law dispute resolution.32 As the 
SEC’s only SRO, FINRA is the primary direct supervisor of securities law 
dispute resolution.33 
Even though ADR has been available since 1817 when the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) held its first internal arbitration,34ADR did not 
become the primary method for securities dispute resolution until the 
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of securities law arbitration in 1987.35 
Before this time, customer disputes normally went through litigation 
proceedings because the Court had been reluctant to approve pre-dispute 
ADR agreements for securities disputes due to the informal nature of ADR.36 
                                                 
25 See id. 
26 See id. (regarding SROs making rules subject to the approval of the SEC). 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 329, 336–38 (2006). 
30 See generally What We Do, supra note 16. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 Gross, supra note 29, at 336–37. 
35 There is no clear reason why ADR was not commonly used even though traders and 
investors could have chosen ADR after the dispute arose. The participants may have been 
reluctant to choose ADR to resolve their conflicts because they thought it might not be 
appropriate based on the Wilko ruling. See id. 
36 See id. 
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Over time, the Court’s thinking on the subject evolved, culminating in its 
opinion in Shearson/American Express in 1987.37 In that case, the Court held 
that claims under the Securities Exchange Act could be resolved using 
arbitration if an arbitration agreement had been executed prior to the 
beginning of the dispute. 38  In return, any such ADR process had to be 
conducted or monitored by an SRO under SEC control. 39  After 
Shearson/American Express, then-existing SROs, like the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the NYSE, started to build 
dispute resolution departments. All of these SROs were unified under 
FINRA’s ADR department in 2007,40 and FINRA presently conducts 99% of 
securities law disputes using ADR.41 
 Securities law disputes filed with FINRA generally arise in two 
forms: customer or industry claims.42 Customer claims fall into six different 
categories: (1) misrepresentation and omission, (2) market manipulation, (3) 
price predictions and guarantees, (4) churning, (5) breach of fiduciary duties, 
and (6) failure of service claims.43 Industry claims fall into four different 
categories: (1) collection claims, (2) Central Registration Depository issues, 
(3) clearing disputes, and (4) employment claims.44 Regardless of the type of 
claim, most disputes will be between a customer and a broker-dealer firm or 
between an employed broker and a hiring broker-dealer firm.45 Structured 
governance is key to fair and reasonable ADR proceedings because parties to 
a dispute often bring disparate legal and financial resources to the negotiation. 
Essentially, FINRA tries to level the playing field between broker-dealer 
firms and individual parties that have relatively limited resources.46 
 
                                                 
37  See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
(demonstrating the Court’s endorsement of the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and 
that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 indicates a federal policy favoring the use of 
arbitration in general). 
38 Id. at 242. 
39 See Gross, supra note 29, at 336–37. 
40 Ernest Edward Badway & Matthew S. Adams, The Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Process in the United States Securities Industry: A Primer, 24 J. TAX’N & REG. FIN. 
INSTITUTIONS 31, 33 (2011).  
41 Crowe II, supra note 12, at 146. 
42 Badway & Adams, supra note 40, at 43. 
43 See id. at 43–47. 
44 See id. at 48–51. 
45 See id. at 43–51. 
46 See id. 
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C. FINRA Arbitration 
FINRA manages securities law arbitration through the procedural 
rules set forth in the FINRA Manual.47 FINRA’s definition of arbitration does 
not differ much from most state and federal definitions of arbitration: namely, 
arbitration is a method of dispute resolution that results in a final 
determination that binds the parties.48 
FINRA arbitration generally follows the pattern set forth in 
Shearson/American Express.49 Once parties sign an investment contract that 
includes an arbitration agreement, they are required to use arbitration when 
settling any conflicts arising out of the execution of that contract.50  The 
parties are technically free to agree on where to conduct the arbitration, but 
most parties agree to arbitrate at FINRA, where all broker-dealers are 
registered.51 As a result, the FINRA Manual provides the governing standards 
used in securities arbitration.52 
In doing so, the FINRA Manual articulates separate guidelines for 
customer and industry arbitration.53 The two standards contain procedural 
rules that are nearly identical except for the eligibility requirement provisions 
for arbitrating cases.54 The rules governing customer arbitrations state that 
                                                 
47  See 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403 
&record_id=5174&element_id =4096&highlight=12000#r5174 (last visited Feb. Mar, 4 
2017); see also 13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403 
&record_id=5272&element_id=4193&highlight=13000#r5272 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
48 See Gross, supra note 29, at 350–51; see also 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure 
for Customer Disputes, supra note 47. 
49  See generally Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
(requiring arbitration to settle a conflict when parties have signed an investment contract 
with an arbitration agreement). 
50 See Davison, supra note 1, at 716.  
51 See Standards for Admission, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org 
/industry/standards-admission (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (regarding registration 
requirements for broker-dealers with FINRA). 
52 Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
101, 105 (2014). 
53 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra note 47; 13000. 
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note 47. 
54 See 12200. Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of NASD, FIN. 
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html 
?rbid=2403&record_id= 11006&element_id=7944&highlight=12200#r11006 (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2017); 12201. Elective Arbitration, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11007&element
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the arbitration agreement must be included in the investment contract in order 
to bind the customer.55 Since all broker-dealers must register with FINRA 
and all conflicts involving broker-dealers registered with FINRA must be 
held there, the rules essentially mandate that all customer arbitration be held 
at FINRA.56 Likewise, the rules for industry arbitration require registered 
firms to resolve industry conflicts at FINRA.57 
To receive an enforceable arbitration award, parties must comply with 
the FINRA Manual’s procedural rules.58 Otherwise, the opposing party can 
file a motion to dismiss the suit—running the risk that the arbitrator might 
accept the motion and dismiss the claim. 59  FINRA regulates arbitrator 
selection, 60  procedural conduct requirements for the parties, and 
                                                 
_id=7945&highlight=12201#r11007 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12202. Claims Against 
Inactive Members, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11008&element_id=7946&highlight=12202#r11008 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12203. Denial of NASD Forum, http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11009&element_id=7947&highlight=12203#
r11009 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); see also 13200. Required Arbitration, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403& 
record_id=11105&element_id=8043&highlight=13200#r11105 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 
13201. Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11106&element
_id=8044&highlight=13201#r11106 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13202. Claims Involving 
Registered Clearing Agencies, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11107&element_id=8045&highlight=1320
2#r11107 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13203. Denial of NASD Forum, FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403& 
record_id=11108&element_id=8046&highlight=13203#r11108 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
55 12200. Arbitration Under an Arbitration Agreement or the Rules of NASD, supra note 
54. 
56  12208. Representation of Parties, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11014&element_id=7952&
highlight=12208#r11014 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
57  13208. Representation of Parties, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11113&element_id=8051&
highlight=13208#r11113 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
58 See generally 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra 
note 47; see also 13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note 
47. 
59  12503. Motions, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com 
/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11057&element_id=7995&highlight=1250
3#r11057 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13503. Motions, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11156&element
_id=8094&highlight=13503#r11156 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
60  12401. Number of Arbitrators, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11039&element_id=7977&
 
52 MED-ARB IN SECURITIES LAW DISPUTES Vol. 2 
 
qualifications for necessary statements.61 The rules cover these matters in a 
fairly exacting fashion; thus, satisfying the given standards may require the 
assistance of attorneys or other representatives with sophisticated legal 
knowledge. 
Despite the level of complexity in this system, arbitration’s 
competitive advantage lies in its economic and procedural efficiency. 
Securities trading parties are likely to turn to litigation in federal court if 
arbitration is impossible. Binding arbitration that complies with the Supreme 
Court’s existing standard can be somewhat complex but nowhere near as 
complex as full-scale federal litigation.62 Federal litigation invariably takes 
far more time and resources than a FINRA-supervised arbitration. For 
example, in litigation, the parties must consider a wide gamut of procedural 
issues unrelated to the substance of the underlying dispute itself. Further, 
parties must comply with demanding court filing deadlines and any unique 
legal customs and rules applicable in the jurisdiction.  
In contrast, when parties use FINRA’s uniform standard for securities 
arbitration, there is no need to worry about additional procedural issues—
instead, the parties can focus on resolving the substantive legal issue being 
disputed. Arbitration also has the advantages of finality and flexibility.63 
Moreover, FINRA arbitration is attractive to parties that want to protect 
private information because its confidentiality requirements are more 
extensive than those in litigation—usually the only thing disclosed at the end 
of arbitration is the outcome of the proceeding.64 
D. FINRA Mediation 
FINRA also allows for the more informal ADR method of mediation, 
which differs from arbitration in many respects. While arbitration results in a 
binding decision based on an arbitrator’s legal analysis, mediation does not 
                                                 
highlight=12401#r11039 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13401. Number of Arbitrators, FIN. 
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403 
&record_id=11138&element_id=8076&highlight=13401#r11138 (last visited Mar. 4, 
2017). 
61 See generally 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra 
note 47; see also 13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note 
47. 
62 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232–33 (1987). 
63 See Gross, supra note 29, at 357–59. 
64 See id. 
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provide a legally binding result, because mediators do not have any authority 
to issue a binding legal judgment. Mediation, completed in an informal 
setting, is designed to provide a mutually beneficial solution for all parties to 
the dispute. Thus, unlike arbitrators acting as active decision makers, 
mediators facilitate voluntary settlements.65 Moreover, while arbitration uses 
litigious hearings attended by both parties, mediation uses a series of private, 
ex parte meetings called caucuses.66  In mediation, the mediator interacts 
separately with each party and hears the differing opinions in private 
settings.67 The information obtained from these meetings allows the mediator 
to pinpoint the issues on which the parties may compromise—enabling the 
mediator to efficiently soothe the conflict.68 Because information from these 
meetings could adversely impact the parties in the event of a lawsuit, all 
information uncovered during the course of mediation is confidential.69 This 
level of confidentiality is higher than in arbitration, 70  and arbitration or 
litigation awards may be repealed when they are rendered based on 
information from mediation procedures.71 
Mediation is a much simpler and cheaper alternative to arbitration.72 
Parties in mediation are likely to encounter even fewer procedural rules than 
are found in arbitration hearings. As previously noted, arbitration employs 
procedural rules that are simpler than traditional court rules; mediation 
simplifies the procedural picture even further. While arbitration must use 
pleading-like procedures to maintain legitimacy, as a tribunal rendering a 
decision according to rule of law, mediation needs no such procedures 
because it is nothing more than a settlement assistance process. Mediation 
provides a catalyst for parties to negotiate a settlement without the help of a 
binding decision-maker, thus saving money. This is not to say that mediation 
                                                 
65 See Initiate an Arbitration or Mediation, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http:// 
www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/initiate (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
66 See Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the 
Same Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 317, 334 (2011). 
67 Id. 
68 See id. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 336. 
71 See id. at 346. 
72 Comparison Between Arbitration & Mediation, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/comparison-between-arbitration-mediation 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
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is not governed by procedural rules; the Supreme Court mandates some 
procedural protection for parties involved in mediation.73 FINRA mediation 
rules govern, among other issues, mediator selection, caucus formats, and 
confidentiality protection.74 None of the rules for FINRA mediation resemble 
the procedural requirements for arbitration.75  Some people may question 
mediation’s procedural sufficiency because, in general, lighter regulatory 
schemes regularly lead to a lack of oversight. 76  However, for FINRA 
mediation, such concerns are largely unfounded because FINRA ADR 
procedures are monitored and administered by two controlling departments: 
the FINRA Office of Dispute Resolution, and the FINRA National 
Arbitration and Mediation Committee.77 These committees oversee FINRA 
arbitration and mediation and also have the power to intervene in individual 
cases should the need to protect one or both parties arise.78 FINRA oversight 
                                                 
73 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 245 n.2 (1987). 
74 See 14000. Code of Mediation Procedure, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http:// 
finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=5373&element_id=42
93&highlight=14000#r5373 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
75 See 12000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, supra note 47; 
13000. Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, supra note 47; 14000. Code of 
Mediation Procedure, supra note 74. 
76 Shahla F. Ali & Antonio Da Roza, Alternative Dispute Resolution Design in Financial 
Markets—Some More Equal Than Others: Hong Kong’s Proposed Financial Dispute 
Resolution Center in the Context of the Experience in the United Kingdom, United States, 
Australia, and Singapore, 21 PACIFIC RIM L. & POL’Y J. 485, 515–16 (2012) (exploring the 
differences between strong statutory regimes and the issues that arise with less stringent 
statutory schemes). 
77 14000. Code of Mediation Procedure, supra note 74. 
78 12102. National Arbitration and Mediation Committee, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY 
AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16704 
&element_id=4101&highlight=12102#r16704 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12103. Director 
of the Office of Dispute Resolution, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra. 
complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16705&element_id=4102&
highlight=12103#r16705 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13102. National Arbitration and 
Mediation Committee, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16709&element_id=4198&highlight=13102#
r16709 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 13103. Director of the Office of Dispute Resolution, FIN. 
INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403 
&record_id=16710&element_id=4199&highlight=13103#r16710 (last visited Mar. 4, 
2017); 14102. National Arbitration and Mediation Committee, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY 
AUTH., http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=16716 
&element_id =4296&highlight=14102#r16716 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 14103. Director 
of the Office of Dispute Resolution, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://finra 
.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11201&element_id=8139&
highlight=14103#r11201 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
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helps to ensure that the informal nature and systematic efficiency of 
mediation do not harm its credibility. 
E. Problems with ADR in Securities Law Disputes 
At first glance, the options for ADR in resolving security law disputes 
do not pose any apparent problems. The FINRA mediation and arbitration 
processes work commendably. These methods have passed the test of time 
and are protected by concrete procedural rules that organize and monitor the 
conduct of the parties. But sometimes neither mediation nor arbitration is a 
perfect solution for resolving a dispute. Accordingly, the FINRA ADR 
regime currently suffers from several problems. 
 First, FINRA mediation is underutilized: it is often overlooked as an 
option in situations where an efficient compromise between the parties might 
be possible. In 2015, among the 3,489 cases resolved under FINRA’s ADR 
regime, only 306 cases were settled through mediation.79 That number is not 
an outlier, as the percentage of mediated cases has remained around eight to 
ten percent since 2012.80 This low rate of mediation is clearly abnormal 
compared to other industries where mediation is on the rise. 81  This 
discrepancy can partially be explained because pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements are allowed in the securities industry—making arbitration less 
complex than it is in other industries. However, the reduction in complexity 
does not fully explain the securities industry’s overwhelming preference for 
arbitration over mediation.82 This indicates that the securities industry may 
be wasting resources on unnecessary litigation and arbitration when many 
disputes could be settled more efficiently through mediation. 
 Additionally, the disparity of use between arbitration and mediation 
may be straining the credibility of FINRA’s ADR regime. While eight to ten 
percent of cases are settled through mediation, 50% of cases are resolved 
                                                 
79 Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7. 
80 See id. 
81 Cornell University’s Scheinman Institute on Conflict Resolution surveyed executives 
of Fortune 1000 companies in 1997 and 2011 and conducted a research analysis comparing 
the results. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving 
Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000 
Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 45–48 (2014). The analysis indicated that use of 
mediation had increased over the period time while use of arbitration had decreased. Id. 
Moreover, 45.8% of the sample stated that they used mediation very often. Id. 
82 Dispute Resolution Statistics, supra note 7. 
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through direct settlement by the parties every year.83 Some people may see 
this phenomenon as desirable, because it seems to indicate that the system is 
adequately encouraging parties to settle. However, as discussed above, most 
FINRA securities cases are a David and Goliath-like struggle between a lay 
individual and a gigantic broker-dealer firm backed by multi-billion dollar 
budgets for litigation and dispute resolution. Therefore, without the 
supervision of a third-party, honest broker, the settlement process risks 
unfairness. Mediation could help alleviate this problem, but FINRA 
mediation has proved too unpopular to offer much help so far. Consequently, 
in order to better protect smaller, weaker parties, FINRA must come up with 
a way to either encourage more mediation or, better yet, create a new system 
comparable with arbitration. 
II. MED-ARB: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
The Scheinman Institute on Conflict Resolution of Cornell University 
added an interesting question to its survey measuring the ADR experiences 
of executives of Fortune 1000 Corporations.84 The question asked whether 
the executives had experienced a hybrid ADR method called mediation-
arbitration (Med-Arb). 85  Of the executives sampled, 51% answered the 
question in the affirmative, thus confirming the growing influence of Med-
Arb. 86  Increasing use of Med-Arb is not limited to the United States; 
internationally, Med-Arb has been studied extensively. 87  Because of the 
many problems associated with ADR discussed above, the time has come for 
FINRA to consider Med-Arb. To understand the value of Med-Arb in the 
ADR context, it is first necessary to provide some basic background 
information on the history and structure of this new tool for resolving 
disputes. 
 
                                                 
83 Id. The percentage of cases resolved through direct settlement for 2012, 2013, 2014, 
and 2015 is 50%, 51%, 52%, and 50% respectively. Id. 
84 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 81, at 5. 
85 Id. at 41. 
86 Id. 
87 See generally Carlos De Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: ‘Med-Arb’ and the Confluence 
of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 
18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149 (2004); Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in International 
Commercial Dispute Resolution, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 411 (2001); and James T. Peter, 
Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 83 (1997). 
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A. What is Med-Arb? 
Med-Arb is a form of ADR that combines features of mediation and 
arbitration.88 The method is a two-stage process: in the first stage, the parties 
try to settle the case using standard mediation procedures.89 If issues remain 
unresolved after mediation, parties immediately move on to the second stage: 
arbitration, in which the remaining unresolved issues are finalized with 
binding decisions.90 This combination provides unprecedented procedural 
efficiency by providing the flexibility of mediation and the finality of 
arbitration in a single package.91  
The use of Med-Arb in the U.S. was first seen in labor law disputes.92 
Sam and John Kagel coined the term “Med-Arb” and first used it to settle a 
San Francisco nurses’ strike in 1970.93 Since then, Med-Arb has been used to 
resolve various types of industrial and commercial disputes, including 
employment disputes, international disputes, and corporate disputes. 94 
However, due to Med-Arb’s distinctive design (which some scholars view as 
potentially problematic),95 its use has normally been limited to specific types 
of disputes that can be carefully overseen by regulatory institutions.96  
There are several variations of Med-Arb, which fall into two broad 
types.97 First, there is the most general type, called Med-Arb-Same or Same-
Neutral Med-Arb. 98  In Med-Arb-Same, the same neutral decision-maker 
serves as both mediator and arbitrator, so the phases continue without a 
change in decision-maker.99 Due to differences in the confidentiality standard 
between mediation and arbitration, some alternative types of Med-Arb 
                                                 
88 See Blankenship, supra note 9, at 28.  
89 Id. at 29. 
90 Id. at 30.  
91 Brian A. Pappas, Med-Arb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 157, 166–67 (2015). 
92 Blankenship, supra note 9, at 32.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 32–33. 
95 See, e.g., id. at 38; De Vera, supra note 87, at 159–60. 
96 For example, Med-Arb became customary in settling labor disputes involving a quid 
pro quo dynamic when management agrees to a procedure that ends with binding arbitration 
in exchange for employees giving up their right to strike or lockout. Because, without the 
right to strike employees would not have as much leverage as management. Med-Arb helps 
to level the playing field. Blankenship, supra note 9, at 32.  
97 Id. at 30. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
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attempt to regulate the power of the mediator-arbitrator.100  For example, 
sometimes the parties might opt-out of the second phase and pursue a separate 
arbitrator.101 The parties might also limit the range of possible outcomes 
available to the arbitrator.102 
The second type is Med-Arb-Diff, in which the two phases are 
conducted with different neutral decision-makers. 103  This obligatory 
restriction attempts to insulate the two stages more effectively than Med-Arb-
Same and prevent any legal issues of confidentiality between the stages.104 
However, requiring this rigid segregation may harm the general advantage of 
choosing the hybrid system since the process becomes less efficient. Like 
Med-Arb-Same, Med-Arb-Diff can vary in its procedural details. For 
example, parties might allow the mediator to write a recommendation to the 
arbitrator of the second stage—allowing the mediator to deliver his 
impressions and interpretations of the case.105 Parties might also expand the 
mediator’s power by allowing him to attend the hearing stage of the 
arbitration.106  These variations, however, do not change the fundamental 
principle that the mediator has no direct say on the binding decision in 
arbitration. 
While separating mediation and arbitration by using two different 
neutral decision-makers may alleviate some of the innate disadvantages of 
the Med-Arb-Same process (such as confidentiality and due process issues), 
Med-Arb-Diff erodes the efficiency gains that Med-Arb is designed to 
maximize. Med-Arb-Diff merely provides an additional ADR option that is 
more expensive than either mediation or arbitration with a single neutral 
decision-maker. Because the additional expense is not balanced against a 
clear increase in efficiency, there is no point in spending time and money 
focusing on such an alternative. Thus, Med-Arb-Same is the best solution to 
the problems discussed above, as it requires only one neutral decision-maker 
for the procedure and may finish at the mediation stage, costing no more than 
a standard mediation. Therefore, the analysis that follows will only consider 
the more efficient system, Med-Arb-Same. 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 30–31. 
102 Id. 
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B. Advantages of Med-Arb 
Med-Arb has many advantages. In order to assess how compatible 
Med-Arb is with ADR in the securities law context, its costs and benefits 
must be carefully weighed. The use of Med-Arb has three general benefits 
over traditional mediation and arbitration processes. First, Med-Arb’s hybrid 
format allows the parties to the dispute and the governing neutral decision-
maker to apply the beneficial elements of both mediation and arbitration 
flexibly. 107  Arbitration alone does not allow the participants to assess 
personal and external evidentiary impressions and intentions. When evidence 
adequately resembles the factual circumstances of the dispute, such personal 
mindsets and invisible intentions may not be relevant to the resolution of the 
dispute. However, evidentiary circumstances are not always a true reflection 
of reality. Giving arbitration an informal touch through sharing ex parte 
conversations during mediation caucuses may provide the neutral decision-
maker with a better view of the real events. 108  Even though the neutral 
decision-maker must delicately filter out confidential information that should 
not be applied during arbitration, he will possess a better understanding of 
the evidence brought to the arbitration stage. 109  This allows the neutral 
decision-maker some flexibility in grappling with the factual circumstances 
of the case.110 Parties will also benefit from flexibly incorporating the two 
different stages, allowing them to better design their case presentations.111 
Second, Med-Arb’s consolidated dispute resolution process should be 
less expensive than holding arbitration and mediation separately. Under Med-
Arb, the dispute might be resolved in either the mediation phase or the 
arbitration phase. If all the issues are settled at the first stage, the procedural 
costs of the suit will roughly equal the costs of resolving the case through 
mediation because the parties only have to pay one decision-maker. Even if 
the process moves to the second stage, the increase in procedural costs will 
not be as great as if the parties had held a separate arbitration after the 
mediation. 112  Through Med-Arb, parties will be able to proceed to the 
arbitration process without incurring the additional expenses of hiring a new 
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arbitrator and selecting a new date, time, and location for a separate 
arbitration. This saves significant time because the neutral decision-maker 
does not have to relearn the relevant factual and legal circumstances of the 
case. 113  Moreover, FINRA will be able to reduce a sizable amount of 
administrative expenses relating to arbitration. 114  When mediation use 
increases at the expense of arbitration use, FINRA saves money because there 
is no arbitration award to post and less meeting space is needed.115 The cost 
reduction continues into the second phase as well because the arbitrator takes 
less time, as the arbitrator is already familiar with the case.116  
Finally, from the outset of Med-Arb, parties know that the process 
will resolve the dispute.117 Thus, the mediation phase of Med-Arb functions 
partially as a negotiation, guaranteeing either a settlement or a mandatory 
arbitration. Such finality strengthens the mediation stage by incentivizing the 
parties to settle at the earliest opportunity.118 Before moving on to arbitration, 
the parties are aware that the dispute will be finalized one way or the other.119 
Thus, settling disputes through mediation is more economical because 
mediated settlements are often cheaper for the parties. This encourages the 
participants to favor a faster, more economical conclusion to the dispute 
through settlement at the mediation stage. 
C. Disadvantages of Med-Arb 
The benefits of Med-Arb however are only one side of the story. 
Scholars have expressed concerns that Med-Arb risks breaches of the 
confidentiality of information shared in the mediation stage. 120  Because 
parties engage with mediators during private caucus sessions, if the dispute 
makes it to Med-Arb arbitration, the neutral decision-maker may have 
already been exposed to more confidential information than the arbitrator 
otherwise would have in a non-Med-Arb arbitration. 121  Some of the 
information discussed in mediation may not be usable in the later rendering 
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of an arbitration decision.122 And although the neutral decision-maker might 
declare that she or he did not use the confidential information in rendering 
her or his decision, it is not unreasonable to presume that such information 
may have had an improper influence. Decisions rendered under the cloud of 
such suspicion may harm the transparency of the mediation process in future 
disputes because parties might not fully disclose certain information during 
mediation. 123  If information is withheld, there is a risk that the parties’ 
interests in a fair resolution of the dispute will be fundamentally damaged.124  
A second problem of Med-Arb is that it jeopardizes a party’s right to 
due process in the arbitration phase.125 The confidential information obtained 
in the mediation phase may harm the procedural structure of the arbitration 
phase by damaging the discovery process and the impartiality of the neutral 
decision-maker. The information revealed during the mediation caucuses 
may prevent the neutral decision-maker from performing adequate analysis: 
the prior information may cause the neutral decision-maker to interpret 
evidence from a biased viewpoint.126 This bias could threaten the impartiality 
of the final decision, potentially undermining a party’s right to due process.127 
This may make parties less likely to proceed to the arbitration stage of Med-
Arb, causing them to prematurely settle in mediation under a perceived state 
of duress.128 
Despite these minor flaws, Med-Arb remains a flexible and 
inexpensive alternative to traditional arbitration: it offers the possibility of 
finality, but may often result in a mediated settlement. These structural 
features make Med-Arb an attractive ADR alternative that lies between 
arbitration and mediation. In addition to the benefit of its efficiency gains, 
Med-Arb also improves the structural operation of FINRA ADR. 
III. IS MED-ARB THE ANSWER? 
Because it is relatively untested in the context of securities dispute 
resolution, this Article presents a careful analysis of Med-Arb’s policy and 
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structure. In particular, this section will demonstrate that Med-Arb is a good 
fit with FINRA. This section will also suggest additional safeguards that can 
help alleviate the concerns some have with Med-Arb’s use in resolving 
securities law disputes. 
A. How Med-Arb Use Meets FINRA’s Needs and Standards 
Med-Arb is a good fit for resolving securities disputes under FINRA. 
First, Med-Arb promotes the increased use of mediation. Parties who fail to 
settle the case at the mediation stage move on to arbitration, where they are 
subject to a final binding decision. Parties therefore have a greater incentive 
to settle in mediation than they would under the traditional mediation-only 
framework.129 The looming shadow of arbitration puts both psychological 
and economic pressure on the parties, incentivizing them to reach a mediated 
settlement on their own terms.130 This emphasis on the mediation stage will 
therefore help promote the use of the FINRA mediation system. Were FINRA 
to succeed in convincing parties to use Med-Arb, its structural features will 
push a significant number of those cases to resolution through mediation. 
Also, as more cases are settled in the mediation phase of Med-Arb, parties 
will become familiar with the regular mediation process and might consider 
using it more often in the future. Because of this familiarity, coupled with 
FINRA’s mediation system (which is governed by detailed procedural 
rules), 131  users will likely begin to use FINRA mediation in certain 
circumstances instead of arbitration or Med-Arb. 
Second, as a less expensive alternative to traditional arbitration, Med-
Arb would compete with other forms of ADR within the FINRA ADR 
market. The current dominance of FINRA arbitration is worrisome at best.132 
A monopoly of one form of dispute resolution may cause overall structural 
decay in FINRA’s ADR regime. For many lay investors and employees 
confronting large broker–dealer firms, FINRA ADR may be a once-in-a-
lifetime event; however, for the broker–dealer firms, FINRA ADR is a 
routine part of doing business. These firms have a substantial advantage in 
arbitration because of their abundant resources and cumulative experience. If 
this is allowed to continue unchecked, it will be even more difficult for parties 
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with fewer resources to be treated fairly in FINRA ADR. Therefore, the 
viability of other forms of FINRA ADR, like Med-Arb, is critical to 
improving the overall procedural fairness of the FINRA ADR regime—
competition may create a more level playing field that larger broker–dealer 
firms are less likely to dominate so thoroughly. 
Med-Arb is an excellent system for stimulating competition among 
the different FINRA ADR options. Med-Arb is a viable alternative to FINRA 
arbitration. Much of the preparatory work and documentation required for 
both mediation and arbitration substantially overlaps in Med-Arb. 
Incorporating arbitration into the second phase of Med-Arb does not 
drastically increase the amount of preparation beyond that which is required 
for mediation; hearing documents and evidentiary filings required by the 
FINRA Discovery Guide are all that should be needed.133 Other than those 
preliminary materials, there is no practical difference between the procedural 
expenses of performing traditional mediation and the procedural expenses of 
settling a case in the first stage of Med-Arb.  
The procedural expenses for Med-Arb do increase if a complete 
settlement is not reached in mediation. However, the increased cost is much 
less than the cost of preparing and organizing a totally new and separate 
arbitration. In Med-Arb, there is no additional cost required to hire new 
arbitrators and set new schedules: all the parties must do is proceed to 
                                                 
133 See 12505. Cooperation of Parties in Discovery, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., 
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5243 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017); 12511. Discovery Sanctions, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY 
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/p394527.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
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arbitration. Med-Arb is an accessible, economical, and practical alternative 
to mediation and arbitration. Med-Arb can alleviate the current arbitration 
monopoly and level the playing field amongst parties.  
Finally, case law and FINRA’s administrative regulations can 
adequately protect the confidentiality of the mediation phase and prevent 
subsequent confidentiality and due process issues from arising in the 
arbitration phase. Currently, the confidentiality of information exchanged 
within the FINRA mediation process is highly protected under FINRA 
Conduct Rules. 134  These provisions specifically prohibit parties and the 
neutral decision-maker mediating the dispute from disclosing, introducing, or 
using information disclosed during the mediation for any outside purpose 
unless the parties agree in writing to such use.135 Some may argue that these 
protections are insufficient because the neutral decision-maker performing 
the mediation will invariably be exposed to confidential communications. 
Once the information is heard—the argument goes—the disclosure of 
confidential information (such as room for flexibility in the demands of the 
parties, previously contemplated settlements, and weaknesses of claims) will 
inevitably influence the thought process of the neutral decision-maker and 
thus compromise the enforceability of the arbitration award.136  However, 
FINRA provisions allow these confidentiality protections to be waived with 
the written consent of the parties. 137  Thus, parties could prevent 
confidentiality conflicts by signing consent forms as a part of the Med-Arb 
process. 
However, if parties to Med-Arb pre-dispute agreements could 
conduct Med-Arb under FINRA’s regulatory umbrella—as parties to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements can—then consent forms might not even be 
necessary.138 FINRA interprets Shearson/American Express to hold that the 
only ADR method enforceable under pre-dispute contracts is arbitration per 
se.139 However, Shearson/American Express leaves open the possibility that 
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other dispute resolution procedures might be covered by its holding in the 
future.140 In addition, a number of court cases dispute the degree to which the 
FAA encourages dispute resolution under the term “arbitration.” For 
example, in Bakers Union Factory, #326 v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,141 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that what the federal government 
purported to accomplish with the FAA was not requiring arbitration per se, 
but rather enforcing any ADR method that the parties agreed to in order to 
reach a conclusive resolution.142 In other words, some jurisdictions have held 
that FAA enforcement is not limited to arbitration per se, and that it is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that other forms of ADR, such as mediation 
or Med-Arb, also meet the Shearson/American Express standard.143  
However, FINRA is yet to acquiesce to this more open-minded 
interpretation, instead only allowing for arbitration per se; FINRA requires 
both parties to file voluntarily signed written agreements when they want to 
use FINRA mediation.144 This may indicate that FINRA would likely require 
parties pursuing Med-Arb to provide similar voluntary consent forms. 
Therefore, requiring the parties to agree to consent forms permitting the 
partial release of information exchanged in mediation may require nothing 
more than adding a sentence or two to the existing voluntary participation 
agreement. Moreover, FINRA’s conservative tendencies suggest that FINRA 
is capable of implementing regulations to prevent subsequent confidentiality 
issues in Med-Arb. 
Courts will likely be loath to enforce awards when confidentiality is 
violated in the mediation phase of Med-Arb. Because it is still relatively new 
and uncommon, judicial precedents regarding Med-Arb are rarely found. 
However, in Bowden v. Weickert,145 the Ohio Court of Appeals vacated an 
arbitration award because the neutral decision-maker used information 
introduced in the first phase of Med-Arb to reach the decision in the second 
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141 749 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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phase.146 In other words, for those situations in which confidentiality is not 
adequately protected by FINRA’s conservative legal provisions, courts are 
likely to provide a second layer of confidentiality protection. 147  As it 
currently stands, FINRA allows parties to vacate arbitration awards through 
procedural rules.148 
B. Suggested Design for FINRA Med-Arb: Hodges Test 
FINRA’s governing rules should provide a proper framework for 
Med-Arb in securities dispute resolution. FINRA is ideally positioned to 
mitigate the negative effects of combining mediation and arbitration because 
it sets high ethical standards that limit the type of voluntary agreements 
available to the parties. 
A recent Louisiana court decision provides one example of how best 
to frame such voluntary agreements. The Louisiana Supreme Court devised 
an innovative framework for deciding whether arbitration agreements can be 
used in attorney–client malpractice disputes. 149  The applicability of 
arbitration agreements to malpractice disputes is a subject of national-level 
legal debates primarily because arbitration creates a potential conflict with 
the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. ABA Model Rule 1.8(h) states: 
 
A lawyer shall not: 
(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s 
liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is 
independently represented in making the agreement; or 
(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an 
unrepresented client or former client unless that person is 
advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a 
reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal 
counsel in connection therewith.150 
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Signing an arbitration agreement could be deemed a settlement of a future 
malpractice claim, which would require the client to receive advice in writing 
and proper notice to seek independent counsel. Thus, consent to arbitration 
might be viewed as a limitation on the client’s right to the many procedural 
protections of a trial such as the right to appeal and the opportunity to 
discover evidence under state or federal rules.151 
In order to determine whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court created a seven-element test.152 The arbitration 
agreement must (1) provide that the client waives the right to a trial, (2) 
require the client to waive the right to an appeal, (3) state that the client 
waives the right to broad discovery under federal and state procedural rules, 
(4) inform the client that arbitration might involve substantial upfront costs 
compared to litigation, (5) explicitly mention that it covers malpractice 
claims, (6) not impinge upon the client’s right to make a disciplinary 
complaint to the proper authorities, and (7) advise the client to seek 
independent counsel before signing the agreement.153 The court held that 
when the agreement meets all seven requirements, it should be deemed 
enforceable because it complies with the ABA Model Rules.154  
The holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court provides an example of 
how FINRA might design a similar rule for Med-Arb that could help shield 
it from potential legal challenges. FINRA could draft specific qualifications 
applying conservative standards that require the client to make an informed 
decision about which rights they might be waiving by participating in Med-
Arb. The FINRA requirements may be less burdensome than those of the 
Hodges standard, as securities disputes are already subject to arbitration. The 
test, therefore, might merely oblige the parties to acknowledge the 
confidentiality issues inherent in the first phase, while also encouraging the 
parties to seek independent counsel before signing. Med-Arb’s cost-effective 
features will make it sufficiently attractive to prospective users, even after 
meeting these seemingly burdensome requirements. Because Med-Arb is 
different than arbitration per se, voluntary consent forms will likely be 
                                                 
151  Steven Quiring, Note, Attorney-Client Arbitration: A Search for Appropriate 
Guidelines for Pre-Dispute Agreements, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2002). 
152 Hodges, 103 So. 3d at 1077. 
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mandatory—the requirement boils down to nothing more than adding 
additional language to the existing consent form. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The FINRA application of Med-Arb suggested in this Article may 
need to be adapted over time. As discussed above, Med-Arb is a relatively 
new and uncommon form of ADR. For formalists who believe in the 
distinctive functions of mediation and arbitration, the idea of combining the 
two procedures may seem an outrageous suggestion—one that would damage 
the procedural integrity of both systems. However, for FINRA, the benefits 
of Med-Arb outweigh its potential costs. In fact, Med-Arb may provide the 
key to mitigating some of the negative effects resulting from arbitration’s 
current dominance in securities dispute resolution. Because Med-Arb leads 
to increased use of mediation, it will make the FINRA ADR regime more 
efficient, thus strengthening it. Although Med-Arb runs the risk of 
compromising confidentiality during mediation, FINRA has ample tools at 
its disposal to minimize the negative effects of this problem without 
significantly eroding Med-Arb’s many benefits. The adoption of Med-Arb in 
securities dispute resolution may not only effectively solve some of FINRA 
ADR’s structural problems, but might also plant seeds that lead to the 
development of other ADR methods that will further improve securities 
dispute resolution in the future. 
